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The Enclosure of Justice: Courthouse
Architecture, Due Process, and the Dead
Metaphor of Trial
Norman W. Spaulding*
We shape our buildings, and afterwards, our buildings shape us.
- Winston Churchill'
Theories of justice have not had much to say about the space in which it
is administered. Renderings of justice are almost entirely conceptual. In
political theory, abstractions about the state of nature (an imagined
condition in imaginary time) are followed by abstractions about consent,
sovereignty, and just distribution that reduce agreement to implication,
authority to inference, and equality to deferred expectation.2 In moral
philosophy, exhortations about right action are offered in concededly
metaphysical (which is to say, atemporal, disembodied) terms.3 And
beyond the question of jurisdiction, which sovereignty implies, and the
right of exclusion, which private property entails, precious little is said in
legal theory about the relationship between justice and the space in which
it operates.4
* Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I am extremely grateful to the reference
-librarians of the Robert Crown Law Library of Stanford Law School for outstanding assistance
locating photographs, architectural drawings, and other archival sources on American courthouses.
Caroline Jackson also provided exceptional assistance with research.
1. Winston Churchill, speaking before the British House of Commons in 1943 on the question of
how the House building should be rebuilt after its destruction in German air attacks on London.
Quoted in AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, TWENTY YEARS OF COURTHOUSE DESIGN REVISITED, at iv (1993).
2. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971); see also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Edwin Curley ed., 1994) (1660); JOHN
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690).
3. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H.J. Patton trans.,
1964) (1785). The dominant alternative relies on abstractions about utility. See JEREMY BENTHAM,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart
eds., 1996) (1789).
4. For examples from contemporary legal theory, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1995); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed. 1994); RICHARD POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990); and JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (2001); cf
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Even with respect to jurisdiction and sovereignty, borders have been
rendered increasingly conceptual as national identity has become as much
a question of memory and desire as of control over specific terrain.s And
physical boundaries remain as porous and contested as ever. Adjudicative
jurisdiction now turns less on physical boundaries than on a set of
speculations about the consequences of action and omission. The
metaphors are still spatial (lawyers speak of minimum "contacts" and
"long arm" jurisdiction), but the analysis is relational and bespeaks the
irrelevance of physical borders to modern social and economic
intercourse.6 Property rights have become similarly abstract.'
Indifference to the space in which justice is administered also may
derive from skepticism, persistent in the theoretical literature and
doubtless shared by the public, about whether justice actually occurs in
the places where it is administered. The long and now stale debate
between positivists and natural law theorists confirms nothing if not a
kind of irreducible ambivalence about whether law and justice occupy the
same space.'
Lior Barshack, The Constituent Power of Architecture, 7 L. CULT. & HUMAN. 217 (2010). Even
Michel Foucault, who was profoundly concerned with the effects of the organization of space on
relations of power, insisted for most of his career on studying the organization of non-juridical space.
See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan
trans., 1977); cf Socrates's claim that the experience of trial is what binds citizens to follow the law.
Plato, Crito, in DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Benjamin Jowett trans., P.F. Collier & Son 1900) ("He who
has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the State, and still remains, has
entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him."). On the abstractions of modern
social contract theory, see Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historical Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 13
(1992) ("Modern contractarian theories consist almost entirely of asking what the people of a society
would have agreed to in the way of institutions governing the distribution of resources, had they been
consulted . . . . It is characteristic of such approaches that they are holistic, systematic, and structural,
rather than local and specific in their conclusions and recommendations."). On the abstractions of
utilitarianism and deontological moral philosophy, see SAMUEL SHEFFLER, CONSEQUENTIALISM AND
ITS CRITICS (1988); and BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985).
5. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD
OF NATIONALISM (1991); see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE
NEW NATIONALISM (1994).
6. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,
952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997); cf Goodyear Luxembourg Tires v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 63 (2010);
J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010). But see Burnham v. Superior Court, 495
U.S. 604 (1990).
7. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration ofProperty, 22 NOMos 69 (1980).
8. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); see also GORDON WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 295 (1969) (describing debate between positivism and












Library of Congress, Prints and
Photographs Division, Histoic
American Buildings Survey.
That ambivalence is strikingly reflected in the use and arrangement of
physical space for the administration of justice. "The Contemplation of
Justice," James Earle Fraser's statue including a miniature Justicia, sits
well outside the United States Supreme Court building on a marble
pedestal at the north side of the staircase leading to the main entrance.
And she is flanked by "The Authority of Law," a man seated holding the
tablet "Lex," backed by a sword.' So one passes justice, already divided
from the authority of law, at what used to be the public entrance to the
building. And of course the building itself, designed in the style of
Corinthian neoclassical revival to evoke religious reverence, is
juxtaposed, albeit at a considerable remove, by an even more imposing
and popular Doric temple of justice at the west end of the Mall. There, a
towering statue of Abraham Lincoln sits alone, surrounded by columns
and texts of his orations. His massive, deep chair is strikingly similar to
elevated chief magistrates' benches "of imposing proportions," common
in English as well as pre- and post-Revolutionary American courtrooms.10
No public remonstration or petition at the steps of the Supreme Court
building has ever equaled those organized before this seat of justice."
9. Unlike traditional representations of Justicia, the figure in the Contemplation of Justice is
seated, is not blindfolded, and holds in her right hand a miniature statue of Justicia whose scales are
held against her body rather than extended. See Office of the Curator, Statues of Contemplation of
Justice and Authority of Law, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (May 25, 2010), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/FraserStatueslnfoSheet.pdf. On the general history of western
images of justice, see IMAGES ET REPRESENTATION DE LA JUSTICE DU XVIE AU XIXE SitCLE (G.
Lamoine ed., 1983); and JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION,
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011).
10. CARL R. LOUNSBURY, THE EARLY COURTHOUSES OF VIRGINIA: AN ARCHITECTURAL
HISTORY 73, 147 (2005). See generally id. at 146-53. On the architecture of the Lincoln Memorial,
see CHRISTOPHER A. THOMAS, THE LINCOLN MEMORIAL AND AMERICAN LIFE (2002); and
Christopher A. Thomas, The Marble of the Lincoln Memorial, 5 WASH. HIST. 42 (1993-94).
11. Scott A. Sandage, A Marble House Divided: The Lincoln Memorial, the Civil Rights
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Figure 2. Lincoln Memorial, Interior, Washington, D.C.
Reproduced courtesy of Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic
American Buildings Survey.
But the meaning of any relationship between justice and the space in
which it is administered probably should not be sought on the National
Mall. After all, the Supreme Court had no purpose-built structure until the
current building was completed in 1935. Prior to that, the Court sat in the
Royal Exchange Building in New York, Independence Hall and City Hall
in Philadelphia, various Chambers of the Capitol building in Washington,
D.C., and even in a private home during the War of 1812.12 Indeed, the
Court's peripatetic existence for a century and a half suggests that the
location, design, and use of courthouses have not been significant to the
administration of justice or any other public ends.
Nothing could be farther from the truth. As recently published histories
of the architecture of American courthouses have shown, state and county
courthouses served not only as public spaces for the conduct of civil and
criminal trials, but for countless other essential judicial and administrative
functions directly affecting the lives of residents, travelers, and people
Movement, and the Politics of Memory, 1939-1963, 80 J. AM. HIST. 135 (1993); see also Sara A.
Butler, The Art of Negotiation: Federal Arts, Civil Rights and the Legacy of the Marian Anderson
Concert, 1939-43, 40 WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 175 (2005); Adam Fairclough, Civil Rights and the
Lincoln Memorial: The Censored Speeches of Robert R. Moton (1922) and John Lewis (1963), 82 J.
NEGRO HIST. 408 (1997).
12. See Robert P. Reeder, The First Homes of the Supreme Court of the United States, 76 PROC.
AM. PHIL. SoC'Y 543 (1936); Home of the Court, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY,
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doing business in the jurisdiction (taxation, licensure, weights and
measures, probate, deed recording, to name but a few)." Court days drew
all levels of society and all manner of social engagement for much of the
nation's first three centuries. 14 Architectural histories further reveal the
relationship of courthouse design and construction to the authority of law
and the legal profession during the colonial period and the first century of
the Republic, and to architects' parallel quest for professional authority.s
There are, however, even deeper and as yet unexplored connections
between justice and the structure of the space in which it has been
administered. As I argue in this Essay, the American concept of due
process of law is itself intimately bound up with the location, design, and
use of law's administrative space. Doctrinally, the dominant, indeed
controlling, metaphor for the constitutional guarantee of procedural due
process is a courtroom trial. That metaphor, with all that it conjures up
about the organization of adjudicative space, emerged as viva voce
confrontation in jury trials came to define the local practice of justice.
Early Americans thus modified English common law and adversary
procedure to suit their distinctive needs in the same period that they began
to design, construct, and use purpose-built constitutions and courthouses.
Part I offers a brief sketch of the history of colonial courthouse
architecture, relying for the most part on architectural histories of early
Massachusetts and Virginia courthouses to identify the major design
stages. I argue that as common law adversarial procedure matured and, in
particular, as the right of confrontation developed to ensure full
adversarial engagement in jury trials during the Revolutionary period,
13. The two most comprehensive histories treating colonial courthouse architecture are
LOUNSBURY, supra note 10; and MARTHA J. MCNAMARA, FROM TAVERN TO COURTHOUSE:
ARCHITECTURE AND RITUAL IN AMERICAN LAW 1658-1860 (2004). For other significant but less
comprehensive studies of courthouse architectural history, see EVELYN TAYLOR ADAMS, THE
COURTHOUSE IN VIRGINIA COUNTIES: 1634-1776 (1966); BOYD CRUMRINE, THE COURTS OF JUSTICE
BENCH AND BAR OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA (1902); HERBERT ALAN JOHNSON &
RALPH K. ANDRIST, HISTORIC COURTHOUSES OF NEW YORK STATE (1977); CARL R. LOUNSBURY,
FROM STATEHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: AN ARCHITECTURAL HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S
COLONIAL CAPITOL AND CHARLESTON COUNTY COURTHOUSE (2001); THE NATIONAL TRUST FOR
HISTORIC PRESERVATION, A COURTHOUSE CONSERVATION HANDBOOK 9 (1976); SUSAN W.
THRANE, COUNTY COURTHOUSES OF OHIO (2000); and Paul Goeldner, Temples of Justice:
Nineteenth Century Courthouses in the Midwest and Texas (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University) (on file with author).
14. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 2001); LOUNSBURY,
supra note 10, at 3-8; MCNAMARA, supra note 13, at 58-63; William M. Offutt, Jr., The Limits of
Authority: Courts, Ethnicity, and Gender in the Middle Colonies, 1670-1710, in THE MANY
LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA 359 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann eds., 2001) ("Courts
were critical social institutions in all colonies, established on arrival or soon thereafter by the first
English settlers to transmit a colonial elite's values throughout the settlements . . . . Courts were an
arena (in many times and places, the primary arena) for presentation and resolution of social conflicts,
within which members of different social groups could contend.").
15. See MCNAMARA, supra note 13, at 11, 65.
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courthouses also became more enclosed. This development centralized
primary adjudicative and administrative functions into a single,
distinctive, and increasingly impregnable building. Enclosure not only
symbolized the independence of law from political, commercial, and
social space; it served to restrict access, limit vandalism, minimize the
disruption of trial, and, perhaps above all, encourage deference to the
administration of justice in a democratic society perpetually anxious about
the authority of law and lawyers. Part II describes how courtroom
interiors were increasingly partitioned and hierarchically segmented to
specialize and control the structure of confrontation within adversarial
space.16 Procedural enclosure arising from increasingly formal rules for
pleading and practice developed apace, rendering law less accessible to
lay persons, making the expertise of lawyers more and more important,
and provoking popular resentment and reform movements.
Having established the significance of spatial and procedural enclosure
to the administration of justice and the guarantee of due process of law, I
consider in Part III why trial has remained the governing metaphor for
due process notwithstanding the fact that actual courtroom trials are
"vanishing."' 7 A welter of scholarship and case law confirms the decline
in public adjudication: courtroom trials have been eclipsed by alternative
dispute resolution in private settings;" many litigated cases are rendered
private by unpublished dispositions and the sealing of settlements and
other court records;1 9 and procedural rules designed to ensure meaningful
16. 1 rely heavily on the monographs of LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, and McNAMARA, supra
note 13, on architectural history in Massachusetts and Virginia in these Parts. These two British
colonies were, of course, unique, and further differences can be found in the histories of courthouse
architecture in other colonies. See JACK P. GREENE, PURSUITS OF HAPPINESS: THE SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY MODERN BRITISH COLONIES AND THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN
CULTURE (1988); GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS: A
STUDY IN TRADITION AND DESIGN, at viii (1960). Nevertheless, the two principal developments on
which my argument about enclosure turns-the revival of classical temple design features in
courthouse architecture in the post-Revolutionary period, and the segmentation of adversarial space
within courtrooms-appear to have been relatively widespread. See, e.g., CRUMRINE, supra note 13,
at 67; JOHNSON & ANDRIST, supra note 13, at 29; LOUNSBURY, supra note 13; Goeldner, supra note
13; see also infra Part lI.C.
I 7. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). It is common knowledge that
more than 90% of civil and 95% of criminal cases are now resolved without trial. For civil figures, see
LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS: 2001 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR 154 (2001); and NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK
OF THE STATE COURTS 22 (2003). For criminal figures, see GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S
TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 22-84 (2003); and Jennifer Mnookin,
Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in America, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1721, 1722 n.3
(2005).
18. Cameron L. Sabin, The Adjudicatory Boat Without A Keel: Private Arbitration and the Need
for Public Oversight ofArbitrators, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1337, 1339-40 (2002).
19. Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771 (2008); see
Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 973 (2008);
316 [Vol. 24:311
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participation and accuracy in administrative decisions have been strained
to the breaking point in order to accommodate the imperatives of mass
processing as well as demands for swift justice in the interests of national
security.20 Due process is increasingly honored in the breach.
Although the degree of deviation from the procedures of courtroom trial
is now alarmingly sharp, the use of alternative fora for dispute resolution
is hardly novel. From vigilantism and shaming to settlement and plea
bargaining, private dispute resolution has always been an important
feature of American civil and criminal justice.2 1 The rise of so-called
"contract procedure" 22 merely reflects redoubled efforts to formalize and
expand upon a long history of private dispute resolution. Even so, the
metaphor of courtroom trial persists in both popular and legal
imagination. Why is this? What is the relationship between the
proliferation of images of courtroom trial in popular media and its
absence in actual adjudication? Why are we constantly imagining trials
that almost never occur? What are the consequences of disaggregating the
sites in which justice is actually administered from the space that gives
shape to our constitutional standards and popular expectations regarding
the proper administration of justice? And what are the defining features of
the new spaces for the administration of justice?
To begin to answer these questions we must pierce the indifference
theorists have shown toward the relationship between due process of law
and the public space in which justice traditionally has been
Lance A. Wade, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process Argument Against Rules
Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. REV. 695 (2001).
20. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind ofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975) (discussing
expansion of due process requirements for administrative hearings following Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1975)); see also infra text accompanying note 93 (discussing due process concerns
implicated in mass administrative claims processing). For cases involving the use of trial by military
commission for enemy combatants detained in the war on terror, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004);
and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). For appellate cases applying Boumediene to evaluate the
sufficiency of procedural substitutes for habeas review, see Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C.
Cir. 2010); andAl Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
21. See, e.g., RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF
AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM (1975); ELIZABETH DALE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1789-1939 (2011); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (1993); PAUL GILJE, RIOTING IN AMERICA (1996); W. EUGENE HOLLON,
FRONTIER VIOLENCE: ANOTHER LOOK (1978); SHERRYLIN A. IFILL, ON THE COURTHOUSE LAWN
(2008); NICHOLAS PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940 (forthcoming 2012); MICHAEL J. PFEIFER, ROUGH JUSTICE: LYNCHING
AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1874-1947 (2004); David Johnson, Vigilance and the Law, 33 AM. Q. 558
(1981). The capacity for complete publication is also a very recent phenomenon. See FREDERICK C.
HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH (3d ed. 1942).
22. See, e.g., David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605 (2010); David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A
Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 973 (2008);
Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005).
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administered. 23 This Essay concludes in Part V by suggesting that what is
obscured in standard attempts to theorize justice is a desire for complete
enclosure-desire for space in which the passionate, messy, and
indeterminate elements of public trial may not only be contained, but
eliminated in favor of dispassionate, rational, and efficient decision.
Recovering the distinctive moment of Revolutionary American history in
which the early formalization of adversary procedure, the development
and specialization of courthouse design, and popular hostility to the
adversary system all converged helps draw this desire for enclosure into
relief. The conflicting aspirations and anxieties that animated the
Revolutionary period (desire for a dispute resolution process that is
orderly, rational, and controlled by experts, on the one hand, and yet
decentralized, accessible, and popularly accountable, on the other) remain
with us. Indeed, as the actual administration of justice approaches
complete enclosure, and as we continue to imagine trials that almost never
occur, this conflict has become simultaneously more acute and more
elaborately displaced.
I. PURPOSE-BUILT CONSTITUTIONS AND COURTHOUSES
Before Revolution and Independence, before democratic consent,
before what we call the Founding, Americans built courthouses across the
colonies to secure the "rights of Englishmen" they would later assert
against the crown by force. Common law reception and the adversary
system in which it functioned were contested, all the more so after the
Revolution. (It was never obvious, after all, why newly liberated citizens
of a democratic society should import standards of justice from their
former colonial sovereign.) But the ubiquity of courthouses and their
central place in the life of the communities they served suggests that
resistance to common law reception and the adversary system were
grounded in the kind of ambivalence that springs from both dependence
and desire. 24 There was of course widespread frustration with the rights
23. Legal scholars have not been totally indifferent. Several important recent works have
attended to visual representations of justice-including the history of courthouse design-and to
changes in American procedural law. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 9; Resnik, supra note 19;
Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, Representing Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to Twenty-
First-Century Courthouses, 151 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 139 (2007). Linda Mulcahy offers a parallel
account of enclosure in the design of English courts of Criminal Assizes in her recent book, LEGAL
ARCHITECTURE: JUSTICE, DUE PROCESS AND THE PLACE OF LAW (2011). Mulcahy's focus is on
criminal trials and the distinctive English practices of sequestering defendants in the courtroom.
Mulcahy's work and the organization of adversarial space in American courtrooms (which I discuss in
Part III) show how important local studies of courthouse design are to understanding the actual
administration ofjustice.
24. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975); WOOD, supra note 8, at 300-05; GORDON
S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992); see also CHARLES M. COOK,
318 [Vol. 24:311
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and remedies of creditors enforced in local courts, and with the lawyers
who profited from such work, but there is no gainsaying the significance
of common-law reception and the adversary system, not only to rights
definition in the new colonies, but to the public rituals and legal
procedures that attended court days.25
At least in the American context, then, the long practice of justice in
local courthouses belies the abstractions of political, legal, and moral
philosophy. There was no state of nature, no time behind the veil. The
local practice of justice via common-law reception well preceded
insistence upon popular sovereignty. Indeed, insofar as the local practice
of justice relied upon the active participation of community members not
only to assess and meet their own needs but to make effective and, as the
case may be, avoid imperial mandates, it cultivated the very knowledge,
dispositions, and discourses from which democratic constitutionalism
would emerge.26
A. Taverns, Townhouses, and Purpose-Built Courthouses
In what kinds of space did the local practice of justice occur? We know
from recent architectural histories that multi-purpose public spaces
(taverns, townhouses, state houses, and public squares) were initially used
THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981);
RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC
(1971); SCOTr DOUGLAS GERBER: A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT
JUDICIARY, 1606-1787 (2011); David Thomas Konig, Legal Fictions and the Rule(s) of Law: The
Jeffersonian Critique of Common Law Adjudication, in THE MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA,
supra note 14, at 97; Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politics and
Professionalism During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2001 (2005). On
the importance of resisting accounts of colonial legality that suggest a "'linear, coherent, coercive
process' between clearly defined protagonists," see Christopher Tomlins's introductory essay in THE
MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA, supra note 14, at 5. Drawing on the work of Jean and John
Comaroff, Tomlins notes that while "legality entered centrally 'into the making of modem history,' . .
. one must allow that it did so 'imaginatively' and 'in inherently ambivalent, contradictory ways."' Id.
(quoting Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff, The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African
Frontier, in 2 OF REVELATION AND REVOLUTION 365-67 (1997); John L. Comaroff, Foreword to
CONTESTED STATES: LAW, HEGEMONY, AND RESISTANCE, at ix-xiii (Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan
Hirsch eds., 1994)). This Essay attempts to expose the ambivalent and contradictory ways that early
Americans sought to enclose the local practice of justice.
25. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14; BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN
THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002); NELSON, supra note 24; Mary Sarah Bilder,
Salamanders and Sons of God: The Culture of Appeal in Early New England, in THE MANY
LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA, supra note 14, at 47, 49.
26. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 74-79
(1967) (describing the conjunction of natural rights, separation of powers, jury trial, and English
common law in American Revolutionary political consciousness); LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 27-
28, 87; WOOD, supra note 8, at 298-99; see also J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND
THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
(1957) (describing the significance of common law practice and ideology, which located legal
authority in "time immemorial" to seventeenth-century English revolutionary political consciousness).
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for trials and other legal proceedings.2 7 Massachusetts town houses
generally were located at the heart of commercial centers and were built
on the English model: a rectangular building featuring a first-floor open
arcade and a second story divided into multi-purpose "assembly rooms. "28
Typically the ground floor served as a marketplace and financial
exchange, while the second floor was dedicated to legislative, executive,
and judicial business.29 Town houses not only "represented the authority
of the king,"30 they were important sites for the dissemination of official
and unofficial information," and they "facilitated the maintenance of
order in their use as militia training spaces."3 2 Government and commerce
were thus combined in centralized, hierarchically ordered public space.33
In mid-seventeenth-century Virginia, after the Virginia Company
replaced martial law with the common law, county courts "became the
central mechanism for maintaining the peace, administering the county's
business, and adjudicating civil and criminal disputes."3 4 But as in
seventeenth-century Massachusetts, "it must have seemed extravagant to
build a structure solely for public purposes. The notion that minor courts
should be housed in a specialized place, much less a separate building,
held little currency in English or colonial society."3 5 So, early on, court
sessions were held in rented houses, magistrates' private houses, and
taverns.36 Many counties "made it a policy to alternate between
established sites in widely scattered locations," much as quarter session
courts in English counties had done to make "attendance accessible to all
regions.""
But this changed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries.38 As greater resources became available, as legal practice
formalized with the steady increase in the population of lawyers, and as
lawyers and judges sought means beyond their personal authority and
specialized knowledge to induce deference in both the communities they
27. MCNAMARA, supra note 13, at 20, 22. The same was true in European countries for
centuries. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 9, at 26 (2011) (describing reliance on town halls for
adjudication).
28. McNAMARA, supra note 13, at 14-16, figs. 1.1-1.3.
29. Id. at 15.
30. Id. at 17.
31. Id. at 17-18.
32. Id. at 19. On taverns and meetinghouses, see id. at 20-21.
33. Id. at 30, 35.
34. LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 17-18.
35. Id. at 60. The choices were surely also influenced by developing ideas about judicial
independence. See ELLIS, supra note 24; GERBER, supra note 24.
36. LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 58.
37. Id. at 58-59.
38. Id at 62; MCNAMARA, supra note 13, at 46.
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served and their provincial government superiors,3 9 municipalities turned
to purpose-built structures. Studies reveal wide variation in many aspects
of early American courthouse location and design. In Massachusetts, for
instance, legal professionals were apparently keen to dissociate courtroom
space from commercial centers, so courthouses were built at a remove
from town houses and adjacent to jails.4 0 In Virginia, by contrast, which
had fewer urban centers and a population dispersed across wide stretches
of land on plantations, "colonists gradually came to build their public
structures on land in or near the geographic middle of the area
encompassed by the county. This method of selection often meant
constructing civic structures in the middle of nowhere, at a place that was
equidistant from all corners of the county."4'
Notwithstanding this variation, common patterns developed in the early
colonial period and were repeated later on the frontier.4 2 More
sophisticated design forms emerged on the eastern seaboard in two
subsequent waves between the mid-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth
centuries. The first purpose-built colonial courthouses were quite humble.
Early Virginia courthouses were "simply fashioned frame buildings
whose structure, size, and configuration differed little from neighboring
farmhouses."43 Colonists "used inferior materials and methods of
construction," producing "structures that would seldom survive more than
one or two decades without substantial repairs." 44 Courthouses were
generally single-story, single-room "earthfast" rectangular buildings.45
Various techniques were used to distinguish the judges' end of the
courtroom, including different flooring, an elevated platform for a table or
bench, wall framing, paneling, molding, clapboards, and a simple railing
or "bar" to restrict physical access.46
Doors located on the sides or at the end facing the bench and bar
opened directly into a single room. There were rarely ancillary rooms for
clerks' offices, judges' chambers, records, or jury deliberation. Judges,
jurors, lawyers, and clients huddled in open court or conferred outside.
The clerks kept records at their home, in jury rooms, courthouse lofts, or
on the courthouse floor "in chests, trunks, boxes, and loose volumes."47
39. LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 61; McNAMARA, supra note 13, at 11, 25.
40. LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 72; McNAMARA, supra note 13, at 53.
41. LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 54.
42. NATIONAL TRUST, supra note 13; THRANE, supra note 13; Crumrine, supra note 13
(describing courthouse development in a western Pennsylvania county); Goeldner, supra note 13, at
111-14.
43. LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 62; McNAMARA, supra note 13, at 22, 53, fig.2.8.
44. LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 67.
45. Id. at 84.
46. Id. at 78-79.
47. Id. at 297.
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Equally rare was any space for lawyers to sit or meet with clients.4 8 Most
floor plans show no space for lawyers separate from the area for the
general public. Taverns intentionally built in close proximity to
courthouses filled the gap:
Whether a private dwelling with a public license or a 'purpose-
built' structure, the courthouse tavern provided rooms to
accommodate travelers, served meals and spirituous beverages to
guests, acted as a business exchange, and was a venue for polite
and raucous public entertainments such as assemblies, theatricals,
lectures, gambling, and sporting activities.49
Taverns offered private dining rooms for a fee, but private meetings
regularly took place in the unenclosed, socially level space of the main
open rooms.so
In sum, the early courthouse was the courtroom. It provided public
space for adjudication with minimal enclosure. Significant court business
was conducted outside the courthouse in taverns and other public and
private spaces. The court was physically unprotected from exterior noise
and disruption since doors and ground-floor windows necessary for light
and ventilation provided immediate access; the internal structure was
relatively undifferentiated; and low-quality building materials left it
subject to the elements and to destruction as an expression of protest. As
Lounsbury notes, "[t]he disgruntled had the disturbing tendency to torch
buildings when the scales of justice tipped in the wrong direction."51
B. Specialization in Courthouse Design
Larger, more imposing buildings, more permanent building materials,
more function-specific use of space, and more direct borrowing of English
courthouse and ecclesiastic architectural themes characterized the second
wave of purpose-built courthouses in the mid-eighteenth century. Single-
room courthouses were replaced by buildings with ancillary rooms for
jury deliberation, record-keeping, and other administrative functions.
Raised-perimeter foundations replaced earthfast construction. Brick and
stonework replaced wood. Most significantly, builders began to pay more
attention to the symbolic and functional significance of exterior and
interior features.
48. Id. at 82-83.
49. Id. at 6, 265.
50. Id. at 38.
51. Id. at 164 (discussing other examples of physical damage short of burning courthouses). Even
in colonies like Massachusetts, which relied on the second floor of town houses into the early
eighteenth century, enclosure was minimal. The space was multipurpose, internally undifferentiated,
disconnected from spaces in which other court business took place, and noise intruded from
commercial activity below. McNAMARA, supra note 13, at 23.
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In wealthy Virginia counties, porches, multi-bay arcaded piazzas, and
pedimented porticos adorned entrances.52 Cupolas, hipped roofs,
compass-headed windows, and large double doors distinguished
courthouse exteriors from domestic structures. Inside, apses were
introduced at the judges' end of the courtroom either by extending the
exterior wall in a curve or by installing the magistrates' bench in a
semicircle to round out the corners of the rear wall. Although magistrates'
benches had already been set on raised platforms and chief magistrates
given a high armchair, "[t]he enhanced status of the elevated bench
curving outward from the center chair conveyed an image of corporate
power and responsibility shared by an entire class of gentry
officeholders."S4 Means of access to the platform became more restricted
in the eighteenth century: simple "bars" gave way to balustraded railings
designed to hold books and court records open to the magistrates;
magistrates' benches received back paneling, cushions, and cloth-padded
armrests; and chief magistrates' chairs received "the most elaborate
ornamentation," including high canopies, wainscoting, pilasters,
dentilated cornices, and greater depth and width than magistrates'
benches."
By the end of the eighteenth century, there was also an "intricate
subdivision of the courtroom into specific places for the court
participants."5 Although there was considerable variation in many of the
details, the main features approached the format of modem courtroom
design and are immediately recognizable. Side entrances opening directly
onto the courtroom floor were eliminated, clerks' desks were set
proximate to the judges' bench, prisoners' docks were placed near seating
for sheriffs and constables, counsels' seating was separated from the
public and either below the judges' bench or facing it, the witness stand
was set off to one side, jurors were situated in rows of elevated benches at
right angles to the magistrates' bench and "enclosed by panels or a
balustrade,"" and, finally, rows of benches facing the judges' bench for
public seating and designated press seating were divided from the
adjudicative space by a second bar.
As with other civic buildings, both interior and exterior design features
of second-wave colonial courthouses borrowed heavily from English
52. LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 108.
53. MCNAMARA, supra note 13, at 65-67.
54. LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 139.
55. Id. at 140-42, 147-49.
56. Id. at 137.
57. Id. at 151.
58. See id. at 164; McNAMARA, supra note 13, at 24, 66-67, figs.1.7, 3.11, 3.13, 4.8.
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courts, English town halls, and, above all, churches.59 Inside, backless
benches facing a curvilinear, elevated, panel-backed bench with a central
canopied armchair unmistakably recalled pulpit and pews; outside,
"semicircular and segmentally arched openings" like the arcaded piazzas,
pedimented porticos, and compass-headed windows common to
eighteenth-century Virginia courthouses copied design features that "first
appeared in late seventeenth-century Anglican parish churches."60 The
authority of the law might be contested by a litigant, advocate, or
spectator, but by the mid- and late eighteenth century that contest took
place in space formally organized and decorated to induce deference to
the administration of justice.
C. Classical Revival Temples
The apotheosis of ecclesiastic influence, and the beginning of the third
wave of early American courthouse design, was Thomas Jefferson's
widely copied design for the Richmond capitol building, completed in
1789, a year after the Constitution was ratified. While in Paris in the late
1780s, Jefferson worked closely with Charles Louis Clrisseau to build a
model for the capitol building based on the Maison Carrde in Nimes.6 1
Jefferson adored the Maison Carrie, and Cldrisseau was an ideal
collaborator. He had spent decades in Rome teaching and drawing studies
of classical buildings, and in 1788 he published detailed engravings of the
Maison Carr6e as part of a study of classical Roman buildings in France.
Other capitol buildings, the United States Supreme Court building, the
Lincoln Memorial, and, most importantly for present purposes, countless
state and local courthouses share the areopagitic design features of the
Richmond capitol building: "a massive hexastyle pedimented portico
executed in the Ionic order" supported by "two-story columns rising
above a plinth"; "a shallow roofline"; stone block walls; columns or
pilasters running the length of the building; and double-tier windows.6 2
That neoclassical form became "standard for new courthouse design in
the first quarter of the nineteenth century." 6 3
59. There was, of course, a broader aesthetic trend of borrowing. See RICHARD BUSHMAN, THE
REFINEMENT OF AMERICA: PERSONS, HOUSES, CITIES (1993).
60. LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 108; MCNAMARA, supra note 13, at 23-24 (describing
incorporation of "design elements associated with Congregational meetinghouses").
61. See THOMAS MCCORMICK, CHARLES LOUIS CLRISSEAU AND THE GENESIS OF NEO-
CLASSICISM (1990).
62. LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 126-27.
63. Id. at 128; NATIONAL TRUST, supra note 13, at 9; see also MCNAMARA, supra note 13, at 68-
73 (describing Charles Bulfinch's design for the 1805 Newburyport, Massachusetts, courthouse); id
at 86-90 (describing the design for the 1810 Suffolk County courthouse); id. at fig.4.7 (describing the
1812 Hampshire County Courthouse); THRANE, supra note 13, at 27-30 (providing photographs and
history of the 1850 Montgomery County, Ohio, revival temple courthouse). Given his reservations
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Figure 3. Virginia State Capitol, Richmond Virginia, Southwest Facade.
Reproduced courtesy of Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American
Buildings Survey.
Jefferson and the courthouse architects who standardized neoclassical
design in America were in many respects merely following a trend that
originated in mid-eighteenth-century France and influenced the design of
public buildings across Europe for more than fifty years. As a historian of
architecture summarizes,
[mid-eighteenth-century French architects] underwrote the
establishment of a strict form of neoclassicism that became the
lingua franca of architectural production from the last quarter of
the eighteenth century through the first third of the nineteenth.
Whether in Berlin, Munich, St. Petersburg, Washington, D.C.,
London, or Paris, buildings of all types and sizes were designed
with representational facades based on the post-and-lintel system
of Greek and Roman columnar architecture. The ubiquity of this
neoclassical ideal was matched only by the restricted palette of its
characteristic forms and the academic rigor of their application.64
But what made neoclassicism uniquely salient in American public
spaces, and especially in American courthouses, was the use of ancient
templar forms designed to inspire religious deference in a new nation
founded on principles of popular sovereignty and republican government.
about common law adjudication, there is some irony that Jefferson's design for the Richmond capitol
was so widely copied for courthouses. See Konig, supra note 24, at 116 (2001) ("[Jefferson] trusted
the legislature more than the judges. Like Bentham, who had urged codification in 1776 so that 'the
fictitious must be substantiated into real,' Jefferson that same year began an effort to codify Virginia's
laws. The effort fell far short of his goals, but in 1812 he still hoped for the complete 'exclusion from
the courts of the malign influence of all [English] authorities' after 1760 . . . .").
64. NEIL LEVINE, MODERN ARCHITECTURE: REPRESENTATION AND REALITY 76 (2009); see also
EMIL KAUFMANN, ARCHITECTURE IN THE AGE OF REASON: BAROQUE AND POST-BAROQUE IN
ENGLAND, ITALY, AND FRANCE 141 (1955).
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Reproduced courtesy of Library
of Congress, Prints and
Photographs Division, Historic
American Buildings Survey.
The space in which law was to be administered and justice done
expressed a durability and faith that could only have been proleptic with
respect to the laws and constitutional structure of the nascent state and
federal governments. These were truly "representational facades"-
designed to address anxieties about how to mediate freedom and authority
in a pluralistic, democratic society by embodying abstractions and distant
promises in a concrete form.6 1
Not only were these third-wave courthouses more imposing, frequently
sitting on plinths higher than the human eye and accessible only via grand
steps, their massive stone facades, multiple courtrooms, and ancillary
rooms for other court functions provided more complete centralization
65. As Leonardo Benevolo has written of the emergence of neoclassicism in the late 1700s,
"Modem architecture was born at the moment when constructional activity was drawn into the sphere
of [the] attempt" to "integrate freedom and authority in a way that might transform them from abstract
and contradictory notions into practical and complementary realities." LEONARDO BENEVOLO, THE
HISTORY OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE, at xxxiv (1971). The association between political, legal, and
architectural projects of the Founders should not be underestimated. For evidence of the many ways in
which the Founders imagined the state "as a work of art," see Eric Slauter's fascinating book, THE
STATE AS A WORK OF ART: THE CULTURAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 98 (2009) ("[I]n the
eighteenth century, political thought and aesthetic theory were mutually constitutive."); id. at 79
("Constitutional discourse in 1787 often figured the revision of the Articles of Confederation as
architectural renovations."); id. at 73 (explaining that new state constitutions were described by
proponents as "'sacred temple[s]' and "the notion of a 'temple' for Liberty was widespread in period
iconography"); and id. at 41 ("In the verbal and visual culture of late eighteenth century America,
depictions of government that reference the human body gave way to depictions of a depersonalized
political apparatus identified most often in architectural constructions."). Neoclassical public
buildings were believed by their proponents to display the "natural," "original," and "essential"
principles of architecture, see LEVINE, supra note 64, ch.2, passim, much as the nation's laws and
constitutional structure were believed by political theorists to express natural, original, and essential
civil and political rights, see BENEVOLO, supra, at xxxiii-xxxiv (exploring analogy between
Rousseau's political theory and neoclassical architecture). See also BAILYN, supra note 26; WOOD,
supra note 8; GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-
1815 (2009). Both political and architectural theories also relied on origin myths. See LEVINE, supra
note 64, at 56-57 (discussing Marc Antoine Laugier's influential Essai sur L 'Architecture, his
"presumption of .. . natural origins" for classical design forms, and the similarity to Rousseau's
description of the "noble savage" in his Discourse on the Origins ofInequality).
326
16
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol24/iss1/16
Spaulding
and enclosure. No first- or second-wave courthouse could have been
successfully "ringed with chains and protected by federal militia" in the
way the 1832 Suffolk County revival-temple-style courthouse was in
1851 during the fugitive slave case involving Thomas Sims.6 6 The
security measures were taken because abolitionists had already rescued
another detained fugitive whose petition for a writ of habeas corpus had
been denied by Chief Justice Shaw earlier that year.67 Fugitive slave trials
were of course exceptional in the degree of dislocation between the
authority of law, public claims for justice, and the space in which justice
was administered-one could argue that abolitionists had succeeded in
disrupting that space, or that Congress had done so at the bidding of
southerners. But the defense of the Suffolk County courthouse draws into
stark relief the openness, impermanence, and fragility of earlier courtroom
designs, as well as the symbolic and real impregnability of the
neoclassical style.
The case also demonstrates the tension underlying enclosure and
partitioning in public adjudicative space-tension running well back into
the colonial period and relieved only in part by the satyr play of
commerce, drinking, games, gambling, and other legal and illegal public
activities that regularly attended court days.68 As one editorial on the Sims
case lamented:
Court Square and the Court House presented a most singular-I
might say sickening and disgraceful appearance. A heavy chain,
supported by iron posts, was drawn completely round the Court
House, and one hundred police officers were employed to guard
every avenue to the 'Temple of Justice.' It was a sad spectacle for
a free State. Most odious must be the mandate that can be obeyed
only under such guards and forces. . . . This is unusual, if not an
unheard of measure. Our court rooms have ever been as open to
inspection as our school rooms and our sanctuaries.. .. 69
Others, of course, found more to lament in the "heated appeals to
66. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1984);
MCNAMARA, supra note 13, at fig.5.2; Leonard W. Levy, Sims's Case: The Fugitive Slave Law in
Boston in 1851, 35 J. NEGRO HIST. 39 (1950).
67. HAROLD HYMAN & WILLIAM WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 153 (1982).
68. LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 5; MCNAMARA, supra note 13, at 9. On the significance of
satyr play in tragic theatre, see FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY, § 7 para. 6 (1872) ("I
believe . . . the cultured Greek felt himself neutralized by the sight of the chorus of satyrs, and the
next effect of Dionysian tragedy is that the state and society, in general the gap between man and
man, give way to an invincible feeling of unity.").
69. Another Slave Excitement, N.Y. EVANGELIST, Apr. 10, 1851. Hyman and Wiecek report that
the Sims trial turned into a "propaganda coup" for abolitionists who ridiculed Chief Justice Shaw for
having to stoop under 'the southern chain on the neck of the Massachusetts court."' HYMAN &
WIECEK, supra note 67, at 153-54 (1982) (quoting Theodore Parker).
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resistance" to the orderly process of law made by Wendell Philips and
Reverend Theodore Parker in their vituperative public speeches on the
square outside the courthouse on the day of the Sims trial. As a Whig
paper editorialized:
Increase the show of resistance and the supporting force of the law
must be increased. . . . Where then, is the good sense in resisting
this law? Is it not wiser and safer and better for every man to
counsel obedience to the law instead of resistance, and to insist
upon it that the remedy for any law is in its repeal or amendment,
and not by making it a shuttlecock of popular feeling and an
element of acquiring political and personal capital?70
As the contest over fugitive slave rendition and slavery made painfully
clear, democratic legitimacy turns on the inclusion and participation of the
community (all the more so in communities in which enforcement
resources are limited)." But in third-wave courthouses, that participation
Figure 5. The Boston Courthouse Is Guarded by Police and Hung with
Chains, Sims Trial at the Suffolk County Courthouse, Boston,
Massachusetts.
Reproduced courtesy of the Stanford Law School, Stanford, California.
70. BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER, Apr. 8, 1851.
71. See EDGAR J. MCMANUS, LAW AND LIBERTY IN EARLY NEW ENGLAND: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND DUE PROCESS, 1620-1692, at 58-72 (1993); TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990);
Offutt, supra note 14, at 359 ("[A] primary goal of the legal elite would be to achieve and maintain
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is carefully structured by hierarchically segmented and "intricately
subdivided" space in courtroom interiors,72 incorporation of specialized
functions in ancillary rooms within the building and navigable only by
trained professionals,73 exterior features delimiting the administrative
space of adjudication as super-ordinate to domestic, commercial, and
merely social or political space, and the proximity of a courthouse to the
parties it serves. In other words, legitimacy and authority in the local
practice of justice depend on a kind of inclusion that operates in and
through carefully orchestrated exclusions.
Inclusion by exclusion is repeated in the incomplete accessibility of
legal doctrine and terminology to non-experts, in rules of evidence
defining whose speech and what forms of speech are legally salient, and
in rules of procedure (i) providing for notice that one's rights are before
the court, (ii) designating what matters shall be heard by a judge rather
than a jury, and (iii) allocating power between judge and jury in jury trials
by determining access to the right of trial and post-verdict review. The
same structure can be seen in the "inherent powers" doctrine supporting a
judge's use of contempt to control conduct in the courtroom and
empowering judges to determine the fitness of attorneys to practice law. 74
Inclusion by exclusion is thus an irreducible feature of adversarial
legalism. It is no accident that it defines both the spatial structure of the
local practice of justice and the ambivalence (the desire and resentment)
with which lay people approach the law and legal experts.
72. On the night of Sims's arrest, his abolitionist attorney, Samuel E. Sewall, was himself
arrested for demanding access to this space. Suspicious that a trial would be held at night in secret to
avoid abolitionist resistance, Sewall accosted a deputy marshal and demanded immediate access to his
client and information about when and where he would be tried. The New Fugitive Slave Case at
Boston, DAILY NAT'L INTELLIGENCER (D.C.), Apr. 7, 1851.
73. The courthouse was not just ringed with chain and guards; Sims was held "in a room in the
Court House, fitted up for such an emergency." The Fugitive Slave Case at Boston, Several Arrests,
Etc., Public Meeting Called, ALBANY EVENING J., Apr. 4, 1851.
74. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (I Wall.) 505 (1874).
75. From Shays's Rebellion to the movement to replace common law with democratically
enacted codes in the nineteenth century, the early history of the Republic is replete with examples of
this ambivalence and the legal profession's attempt to rebut and, where necessary, commandeer
popular reform movements. On Shays's Rebellion and attacks on the courts and legal profession in
Massachusetts, see ROBERT A. GROSS, IN DEBT TO SHAYS: THE BICENTENNIAL OF AN AGRARIAN
REBELLION (1993); LEONARD RICHARDS, SHAYS's REBELLION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION'S
FINAL BATTLE (2002); and DAVID SATZMARY, SHAYS'S REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN
INSURRECTION (1980). There were precursors in the pre-Revolutionary period. See Richard Lyman
Bushman, Farmers in Court: Orange County, North Carolina, 1750-1776, in THE MANY LEGALITIES
OF EARLY AMERICA, supra note 14, at 388 (discussing the Regulator controversy in North Carolina).
On public concerns about the authority of legal experts in antebellum American society, legal reform
efforts, and the response of the legal profession, see BURTON BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF
PROFESSIONALISM (1976); MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY,
1776-1876 (1976); ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA
(1965); COOK, supra note 24; ELLIS, supra note 24; FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 391-411;
CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL
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II. ADVERSARIAL SPACE, REAL AND IMAGINED
At the core of this structure of enclosure defining the terms of inclusion
by exclusion in the administration of justice is the courtroom interior, and
within that core is the space reserved to participants. The structure of this
adversarial space has been remarkably consistent since the late colonial
period when it first became "intricately subdivided." The exclusivity of
the space increases as one moves from the public area at the back past
seating for parties, lawyers, prisoners, sheriffs/bailiffs, jurors, the witness,
the reporter, and the clerk to the judge's bench. On a symbolic level,
elevation, ornamentation, and partitions (specialized boxes, benches, bars,
and tables) serve to fix and hierarchically segment lay and expert role
players. At the visual and aural level, however, the division of space
accentuates accessibility. The standard organization of partitions ensures
proximity, audibility, and clear sight lines to stage adversarial
confrontation-sequences of viva voce testimony and argument directed
by the judge and elicited by attorneys.
Recent research reveals that the right of confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses, though long a part of English common law
procedure and having roots in both Roman and Hebrew law, did not
formalize in England until the middle of the seventeenth century.7 6 It was
nevertheless rather quickly embraced and expanded in America during the
Revolutionary period. The catalyst for formalization in England was a
string of notorious treason trials in Tudor and Stuart England, including
the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, whose conviction was obtained by
introducing the written, pre-trial confession of an alleged co-conspirator
over Raleigh's demand that the author be produced as a witness at trial
and subject to cross-examination. Subsequently, Acts of Parliament
"repeatedly required that accusing witnesses be brought 'face to face'
with the defendant," and in 1662, the King's bench unanimously
reaffirmed the right of confrontation by excluding custodial confessions
made by alleged accomplices.17
TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2008); GERARD W. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE
EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1760-1840 (1979); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1960 (1979); DANIEL WALKER HOWE,
THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF AMERICAN WHIGS (1979); PERRY MILLER, THE LEGAL MIND IN
AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR (1962); NELSON, supra note 24; 1 SPEECHES,
ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (A.P. Sprague ed., 1884);
CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815-1846 (1994); and
Spaulding, supra note 24.
76. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171,
1205 (2002); see also Brief for Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (discussing
history of confrontation right); JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, MOORE'S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE (Matthew Bender ed., 3d ed. 1997) (discussing history of confrontation right).
77. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 76, at 1205-06.
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"The confrontation right naturally found its way to America," and by
means that highlighted its procedural significance during precisely the
period in which courtroom interiors were becoming more intricately
subdivided." As Friedman and McCormack write:
American criminal procedure developed in a distinctive way. The
right to counsel in felony trials developed far more quickly in
America than in England, and with it rose an adversarial spirit that
made the opportunity for confrontation of adverse witnesses
especially crucial. . .. [T]he right became especially relevant to
American concerns when in the 1760s Parliament began to
regulate the colonists through inquisitorial means like the Stamp
Act, which provided for the examination of witnesses upon
interrogatories. In the Revolutionary period, the right to
confrontation was frequently expressed, especially in the early
state constitutions. Some used the time-honored "face to face"
phrase; others, following Hale and Blackstone, adopted language
strikingly similar to that later used in the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause. It is clear that the Framers were aware not
only of the American history of the confrontation right, but also of
the abuses in the sixteenth and seventeenth-century treason trials
and of the defendants' demands for meeting their accusers "face to
face." 9
Partitioning role players in fixed benches, boxes, stands, bars, and
tables in mid- to late-eighteenth-century courtrooms structured the
adversarial space in which this face-to-face confrontation occurred.
Although the confrontation right was thought to enhance the reliability
of evidence presented at trial, the accused did not lose his right of
confrontation on a showing that the evidence to be offered in lieu of live
testimony was reliable, nor even on a showing that live testimony was
impossible because the witness was deceased."o The accuracy of trials
therefore could not have been the only procedural value served by
requiring confrontation viva voce. "On the contrary, the confrontation
principle was a categorical rule, a basic matter of the procedures by which
testimony was taken."" But why a categorical rule? What procedural and
other values warrant the exclusion of reliable evidence? Why was
adjudication so intimately bound up with live, public confrontation and
cross-examination?
78. Id. at 1207-08.
79. Id.
80. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 76, at 14; Friedman & McCormack, supra note 76, at
1208 ("[N]either in the statutes, caselaw, nor commentary was there a suggestion that, if the courts
determined that a particular item or type of testimony was reliable, then the accused lost his right of
confrontation.").
81. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 76, at 1208.
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Friedman and McCormack suggest that the confrontation right was
linked to expansion of the right to counsel in criminal cases. And
expansion of the right to counsel is taken as evidence of a distinctive
American enthusiasm for the adversary system.8 2 The argument finds
further support in the growth of the population of lawyers in America and
the parallel increase in the formality of both civil and criminal procedure
in the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary periods.83 Americans and
their entrepreneurial lawyers took up and gradually extended traditional
English common law ideologies about the interdependence of due process
of law, trial (especially jury trial), personal liberty, and separation of
powers through the local practice of justice.84 Infringements upon life,
property, and other incidents of personal liberty required, it was
contended, an opportunity for litigants to be heard before an impartial
adjudicator and an opportunity to hear and orally examine witnesses
against them.
Whatever the effect on the reliability of adjudication, adversarial trial
process ensured that litigants would experience and directly participate in
the process in which their rights were defined. More than that, with juries,
spectators from the community, and press all present, the scene of
confrontation became a public stage-a familiar, indeed immediately
recognizable enclosure, in which the process of rights definition was
made public in a way that invited substitutions in individual
consciousness and popular culture. American trials have always been
popular forms of public entertainment. Court days were widely attended
well into the nineteenth century, and the trial scene has been, and is now,
endlessly reproduced in popular culture. 85 Law, as Tocqueville put it, has
82. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (2003); Randolph N.
Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77
(1995); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Rise of the American Adversary System: America Before England,
14 WIDENER L. REv. 323 (2009).
83. See BLOOMFIELD, supra note 75; FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 94-102, 391-411, 633;
NELSON, supra note 24.
84. Juries in early America decided not only questions of fact, but questions of law; appeals from
an initial jury trial in some states were to another jury trial, not to a panel of appellate judges; trial and
appellate judges had no real means to enter judgment against a jury verdict; and summary judgment
did not exist. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting); FRIEDMAN,
supra note 14, at 153-55; NELSON, supra note 24; SATZMARY, supra note 75 (describing multiple
layers ofjury trial in Massachusetts); Bilder, supra note 25, at 62-77. On the relationship between the
Founders' experience of abusive judicial authority during the colonial period and their preference for
jury trial to protect political and civil liberties, see generally ELLIS, supra note 24; THE FEDERALIST,
Nos. 81, 82 (Alexander Hamilton); NELSON, supra note 24; JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ch. 38 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 1891); and ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 302-18 (2004); and 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71
(H.A. Washington ed., 1854) (quoted in Black's dissent in Galloway: Jefferson considered "trial by
jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the
principles of its constitution").
85. On trials as nineteenth-century public entertainment, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 14; and
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become our "vulgar tongue," channeling all manner of social interests and
disputes into adversarial space (both real and imagined) and into the
discourse of rights." A camera shot of the wood-paneled witness box
adjacent to and below the judge's bench; the standard reverse shot from
over the shoulder of a testifying witness to the litigants whose case her
testimony helps or hurts and interested community members sitting
behind the bar; the movement and sound of the judge's gavel; jurors
seated in double rows at right angles to the judge's bench in a larger wood
paneled box near the witness stand-each of these images not only
operates as a common synecdoche for trial in popular consciousness, but
for the local practice of justice as well.
Due process thus has a readily identifiable spatial structure with deep
historical and cultural resonance. It is the trial courtroom. And
notwithstanding perennial accusations that due process of law is a
guarantee of "wide, varied, and indefinite content,"" courts and legal
commentators have systematically relied upon the courtroom trial as an
organizing metaphor. In one of the few U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing
with the procedural incidents of the federal right before the Civil War,
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.," the Court
directly identified "due process of law" with the "by the law of the land"
clause in Magna Carta." It did so on the premise that "'due process of
law' generally implies an actor, reus, judex, regular allegations,
opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course of
judicial proceeding."90 Moreover, the Court held that the proper method
for testing novel procedures against the constitutional guarantee is "to
look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the
common law and statute law of England, before the emigration of our
ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil
and political condition by having been acted on by them after the
settlement of this country."9 ' We know what due process of law is by
LOUNSBURY, supra note 10, at 5. On modem representations of trial and the homologous structure of
film and trial, see CAROL J. CLOVER, Law and the Order of Popular Culture, in LAW IN THE
DOMAINS OF CULTURE 97 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 2000).
86. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 84, at 280 ("Scarcely any political question arises that is not
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question. Hence all parties are obliged to borrow, in their
daily controversies, the ideas, even the language, peculiar to judicial proceedings. As most public men
are or have been legal practitioners, they introduce the customs and technicalities of their profession
into the management of public affairs. The jury extends this habit to all classes. The language of the
law thus becomes, in some measure, a vulgar tongue ... ).
87. RODNEY MOTr, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL TREATISE 123
(1926).
88. 59 U.S. 272 (1855).
89. Id. at 276.
90. Id. at 280.
91. Id. at 278.
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looking to traditions established in the local practice of justice.
As in many cases decided by antebellum state courts, this interpretive
method canonized trial by jury as the touchstone.9 2 Even the recognition
of exceptions to trial by jury helped to define the rule as procedural
innovations were measured for their degree of deviance from the incidents
of jury trial. Modem caselaw is in accord. Indeed, modem courts are
constantly imagining the adversarial space of the trial courtroom as they
decide what procedures should govern pre-trial procedures, alternative
forms of dispute resolution, and the operation of the modem
administrative state. Moreover, because due process is a constitutional
guarantee, legislators, administrators, and others engaged in designing
private alternatives to adversary adjudication are bound by the same
metaphor. The adversarial space of the trial courtroom thus suffuses both
popular and legal conceptions of what it means for justice to be done.
III. DEAD METAPHOR
What then are we to make of the fact that the actual use of space from
which the metaphor derives is diminishing? Lawyers and laypeople speak
the vernacular of courtroom trial, and we are constantly imagining
adversarial space and displacing it onto other public, private, and fictional
venues for decision making, but actual trials are rare indeed. What are the
consequences of the touchstone of due process existing only as metaphor?
Not all metaphors are conceits, of course,.and dead metaphors are among
the most powerful. Moreover, as long as other procedures provide reliable
evidence, accurate decisionmaking, and efficient resolution, it is not
obvious that the practice of justice, local and otherwise, is threatened by
the disappearance of courtroom trials.
But there are reasons to worry. To begin with, private systems of
dispute resolution rely parasitically on courtroom trial. Existing systems
are literally and figuratively "court-annexed." Even systems that operate
independently of the courts rely heavily on the expertise of a now-
diminishing class of the legal profession-lawyers with extensive jury
92. See JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 13-14 (Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. ed.,
1873); STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES, supra note 84, at 692; Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process:
The Original Understanding, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 360 (1987) ("In looking to 'those settled
usages and modes of proceedings existing in the common and statute law of England' courts ruled
almost without exception that a jury trial . . . was the procedure necessary to validate deprivation of
life, liberty, or property."); Eberle, supra, at 349-60 (gathering and describing early state cases).
93. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004);
United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532 (1984); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
see also JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985); Richard C. Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice,
47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000).
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trial experience. Civil lawyers without trial experience commonly retain
an experienced trial lawyer to advise them about settlement or help induce
the other side to settle by introducing an authoritative estimate of the
likely jury verdict and by signaling intrepidity about going to trial.94
Dispute resolution "neutrals," especially arbitrators, typically are drawn
from the same pool of experienced judges and trial lawyers for the same
reason." Settlement is surely possible beyond the shadow of the
courthouse, and without trial lawyers, but, for the most part, we have not
constructed alternative dispute resolution systems on alternative
expertise.
Second, although trial is not cheap, the social costs associated with
systems of dispute resolution that occupy no public space are
considerable. Sealed settlements allow repeat offenders to persist in
malfeasance for years without public scrutiny or accountability;9 7
confidentiality rules in alternative dispute resolution promote open
internal deliberation but also conceal coercion and bias; 98 and even when
courts do decide cases, unpublished dispositions and depublication of
decisions already rendered challenge the most basic rule-of-law values.
One noteworthy study has shown that the plaintiff win rate in employment
discrimination cases at the federal district court level "is four times higher
in published than in unpublished opinions." 99 There is thus an already
94. CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT § 16.11 (5th ed.
2005).
95. See JOHN W. COOLEY, THE ARBITRATOR'S HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2006).
96. Mediation and restorative justice present exceptions in civil and criminal practice,
respectively. On mediation, see DWIGHT GOLANN & JAY FOLBERG, MEDIATION: THE ROLES OF
ADVOCATE AND NEUTRAL (2011); and Lon Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL.
L. REV. 305, 327 (1971) (describing the essential quality of mediation in civil cases as the "capacity
to reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to
achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship"). But see Kirk Johnson, Public Judges as
Private Contractors, A Legal Frontier, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1994, at BI I (describing entry ofjudges
into the industry of mediation services); Craig McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers, 79 MINN. L.
REV. 1317 (1995) (discussing mediator's obligation to disclose relevant law where necessary to
correct power imbalances). On restorative justice, see JOHN DUSSICH & JILL SCHELLENBERG, THE
PROMISE OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: NEW APPROACHES FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEYOND (2010);
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS (Andrew
von Hirsch et al. eds., 2003); and Albert W. Dzur, Restorative Justice and Civic Accountability for
Punishment, 36 POLITY 3 (2003).
97. On confidential settlements and sealed records in the Catholic priest sexual abuse scandals,
see Walter V. Robinson et al., Scores of Priests Involved in Sex Abuse Cases, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 31,
2002, at Al; and Catholic Church Mishandled Reports of Sex Abuse, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 11,
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryld=126390884. See also Symposium,
Secrecy in Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301 (2006).
98. Timothy Hedeen, Coercion and Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation, 26 JUST.
SYS. J. 1 (2005).
99. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 99-100, 104, 105 (1999); see also Joseph L. Gerken, A Librarian's Guide to
Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 96 L. LIBR. J. 475, 478 (2004); Levin, supra note 19. See generally
RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 9, ch. 14.
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massive and steadily expanding body of subterranean law.
Third, as courtroom trial becomes mere metaphor, the substantive rights
trial used to define have become mere modes of declamation in well-
funded, high-profile, fully litigated cases increasingly dissociated from
the action of courts and dispute resolution practitioners in run-of-the-mill
cases. This is not a tension between law on the books or the glittering
generalities of rights talk, on the one hand, and law in action, on the
other; 0 but a problem of law off the books altogether, law operating in
fully enclosed spaces. With run-of-the-mill cases increasingly decided in
private, confidential, and sealed spaces, the discursive habits, the legal
and cultural practices, and, above all, the rules of decision governing their
resolution, are rendered opaque-in some instances, unknowable. The
displacement and private enclosure of adjudicative space thus alters the
very epistemology of justice.
Finally, outside the courtroom, and increasingly within it, the right to a
meaningful hearing is more honored in the breach. Constitutionally
suspect rules permitting trial judges to take cases away from juries before
and after trial have steadily expanded;'o' in collateral judicial review of
criminal convictions, state and federal courts have taken to rubber-
stamping denials of basic constitutional rights;102 there is even less
enthusiasm for exercising meaningful judicial review over erroneous
arbitration awards;10 3 the constitutional standard for the right to effective
assistance of counsel in criminal cases is now so strict that a jurisprudence
has developed to specify precisely how long an attorney must be asleep
100. See Paul Carrington & Erika King, Law and the Wisconsin Idea, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 297
(1997).
101. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); see also Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007). On increased judicial discretion after verdict, see
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
102. See Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (emphasizing that federal courts
may not grant habeas relief merely because they come to the conclusion that the state court has
incorrectly applied federal law; "the most important point is that an unreasonable application of
federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law ... a federal habeas court may not
issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-
court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly"); see also Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Doody v. Schriro, 596 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), vacated,
Ryan v. Doody, 131 S. Ct. 456 (2010).
103. See E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000) ('"[Als long as
an [honest] arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope
of his authority,' the fact that 'a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to
overturn his decision."') (quoting Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). For an
extreme case, see Moncharsh v. Heily & Blas6, 3 Cal. 4th 1 (1992). For commentary indicating that
arbitration is biased in favor of repeat players, see Thomas E. Carboneau, Arbitral Justice: The
Demise ofDue Process in American Law, 70 TULSA L. REV. 1945 (1996); and Brian G. Garth, Tilting
the Justice System, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 927, 950-52 (2002).
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during trial to warrant reversal;104 in civil cases, counsel is rarely provided
by the state and beyond the means of most poor and middle-income
litigants;'os and in administrative settings, massive caseloads and
inadequate judicial review have led to wide variation in outcomes and
shockingly inadequate attention to the factual record in individual
cases. 10 6 Not only the epistemology of justice but the basic practices that
ensure decision on the merits are shifting.
IV. SEEING THAT JUSTICE IS DONE
A 1973 report prepared by the Joint Committee on the Design of
Courtrooms and Court Facilities and sponsored by the American Bar
Association and the American Institute of Architects describes ideal-
typical courtroom partitioning derived from a survey of existing
courthouses and their core functions.0 7 The report includes a figure
depicting "a total communication system for jury trials" composed of
partially overlapping and intersecting triangles shaped by lines
representing a composite of visual accessibility, audibility, movement,
and document flow among courtroom principals. Bold lines shape
triangles connecting judge-witness-attorneys, judge-witness-jurors, judge-
attorneys-jurors, and judge-parties-attorneys. Secondary triangles with
thinner lines represent points of access among subordinate participants
and principals. Press and public areas are positioned just outside these
triangles of communication. The figure perfectly displays the structure of
enclosure we have inherited from the local practice of justice in early
American courts.
104. See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 349 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (reversing panel
decision that upheld capital sentence where defense lawyer was asleep during trial but expressly
"declin[ing] to adopt a per se rule that any dozing by defense counsel during trial merits a
presumption of prejudice"); see also Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 685-90 (2d Cir. 1996); Javor v.
United States, 724 F.2d 831, 832-35 (9th Cir. 1984).
105. DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3-19 (2004); David Luban, Taking Out the
Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 209 (2003); see
also Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
106. For a recent example drawn from asylum cases, see lao v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 530, 533-35
(7th Cir. 2005); see also Immigration Judges, TRAC IMMIGRATION (July 31, 2006),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160/.
107. A. BENJAMIN HANDLER, THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE: PLANNING AND DESIGN FOR THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 29, fig.3.9 (1973). The book was influential, prompting the drafters to return to the
subject. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 1; infra Figure 6.
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Figure 6. A. Benjamin Handler, The American Courthouse: Planning and Design for
the Judicial Process.
Copyright 1973 0 by the American Bar Association. Reprinted with permission. This information or any portion thereof may
not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the
express written consent of the American Bar Association.
The report then considers a number of design "innovations," suggesting
under the heading of "observation space problems" that, in order to
prevent disruption, a glass wall and sound system might be used to
separate the adversarial space from the "public observation space."'os To
prevent even "visual distraction from the audience," the report suggests
installing "one-way glass" and "revolutioniz[ing]" courtroom design by
using closed-circuit television to centralize public observation space "on
the lower floors of a multilevel building" and to separate "[p]ublic traffic
. . . from the traffic of courtroom participants."' 09 Quoting a judge who
insists that courtrooms exist for participants, "'not to provide an
amphitheatre for those interested in watching a particular procedure,"' the
report concludes that "[m]ost courtrooms require only sufficient space to
accommodate relatives and friends of the defendant or people directly
related to the case," and sufficient space to accommodate seating for
impaneling a jury in jurisdictions that conduct voir dire in the
108. HANDLER, supra note 103, at 30.
109. Id. at 31.
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courtroom.o Finally, the report discusses means of making trial more
efficient by replacing open trial with recorded testimony pre-screened by
attorneys and the court to address evidentiary objections, and then re-
screened in edited form on television monitors in jury rooms."'
Both the separation of the public from what the report calls the "action
area" of the courtroom and the separation of jurors from witnesses and
attorneys through edited video recording stand in no small degree of
tension with the report's opening bromides that "[t]he doors of the temple
of justice must always be open to the people," and that "[e]ach courthouse
must be a symbol of the American dream of true justice" so that "citizens
will be assured that justice is a functioning reality of the American way of
life."'12
The tension may perhaps be explained by the fact that the report was
written in the midst of a dramatic expansion of procedural due process
rights by the Supreme Court, a period of civil disobedience in which
courthouses were regularly made sites of resistance to law, and just a few
years before public debate about frivolous litigation, excessive jury
verdicts, and overzealous advocacy would explode, provoking a new
cycle of procedural reform and retrenchment." 3 In the intervening
decades, trials have continued to rely upon viva voce testimony, but the
perceived need for enclosure-a need present in even the earliest purpose-
built structures for adjudication-has intensified. Metal detectors,
permanent identification checkpoints supervised by armed sheriffs or
federal marshals, diversion from traditional public entrances, glass walls
and even closed-circuit television dividing public from the adversarial
space of courtrooms, are all regularly employed in the name of enhancing
courthouse security, increasing efficiency, and preventing disruption." 4
Even for parties to litigation, security measures have become more
elaborate. A line of cases now delimits the degree of state force that can
110. Id. at 30.
111. Id at31.
112. Id. at 5.
113. On the procedural due process revolution, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Although political and social movements animated the Second Reconstruction, structural reform
litigation and hence trial court equity power were pivotal both to proponents and opponents of
desegregation. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Walker v.
City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). Concerns about frivolous litigation sharpened in the debate
about tort reform that emerged in the mid-1970s. See John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100
Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1021 (2005);
Robert L. Rabin, The Politics of Tort Reform, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 709 (1992); see also FED. R. Civ. P.
II advisory committee notes to 1983 amend. (discussing adoption of mandatory sanctions to deter
frivolous litigation). On the new cycle of procedural reform, see A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive
Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353 (2010). On the associated critique of excessive
adversarialism in lawyers, see ARTHUR APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES (1999); and DEBORAH
L. RHODE, ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION (2000).
114. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 9, at 167, 173.
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be deployed to ensure courtroom security without undermining the
presumption of innocence in criminal trials.11 Finally, a gradual but
steady shift of authority from juries to judges and from judges to dispute
resolution "neutrals" has moved the site of adjudication from courtrooms
to the more enclosed spaces of judges' chambers and private conference
rooms.116
Enclosure offers control, efficiency, and rationality in the
administration of justice. By specializing the use of space and restricting
access, disruption and surprise can be avoided, deference can be enforced
in participants and observers, extraneous or prejudicial information and
events can be excluded from the perceptual range of decisionmakers, and
the ungovernable passions social and legal conflict provoke can be
minimized to promote rational deliberation. No system of dispute
resolution can function without enclosure; all depend on it to prevent
vigilance from descending into vigilantism.
But the enclosure of justice should not be conflated with justice itself;
nor should the desire for enclosure be conflated with the desire that justice
be done. To enclose justice is not, in the end, to do justice, or to ensure
that it will be done. The disorder of open trial is due in no small measure
to the fact that it is a system of representation which reproduces in its
formal structure the very indeterminacy (factual and legal) it is designed
to resolve. Inside the triangular lines of communication that shape the
adversarial space of a courtroom, participants make and test
representations about the dispute in each other's presence and in real time.
The representations made can never be fully scripted even if they are
scrupulously prepared. It is dynamic space-as dynamic as the memories
that factual representations are designed to recall and as dynamic as the
interpretive gap between general propositions of law and concrete cases.
Effective resolution arises not just from ensuring accurate outcomes,
nor just by allowing direct participation in the process of rights definition,
but by organizing enclosure in such a way that the anxiety of the
participants and the public about the indeterminacy of justice is put in
play. Resistance, disruption, surprise, adversarial excess, deception,
nullification, and passion are neither endorsed nor invited, but they are
always possible. There is room then for unexpected reversals-room for
the embarrassment of reason to be displayed in the very space in which
we expect and hope to see reasoned argument prevail. And there is public
space in and about the courthouse for satyr play-space in which the local
115. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986). None of
this is to deny that the security threats are real.
116. See supra Part IV; see also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374
(1982).
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practice of justice can be mocked, satirized, defied, called to account, or
ignored altogether while court is in session and the community is present.
The organization of this space thus concedes, if it does not celebrate, that
justice is not a set of fixed principles to be applied, but a set of relations to
be mediated.
Fully enclosed adjudicative space, by contrast, expresses hostility to the
indeterminacy of law and fact. Only polished opinions are to be published
or cited; the idiosyncrasies of juries are to be strictly contained, indeed,
superseded by the rational deliberation of judges; and, above all, the
disorder and delay of open trial and litigation are to be replaced whenever
possible by the private ordering of alternative dispute resolution systems.
Reason is not to be embarrassed.
I have no naive faith in, nor maudlin attachment to, the courtroom trial.
Nor do I believe the mere endurance of a social practice over time is
sufficient to command allegiance-though, as a doctrinal matter, history
is constitutional pedigree in due process analysis. 117 And while
participation and imaginary substitution may enhance democratic
legitimacy, it would be a mistake to see any uncontroversial endorsement
of adversarial legalism in the local practice of justice. As the post-
Revolutionary period reveals, procedural complexity in litigation and an
ideology that tied adversarial trial process to personal liberty may have
served more to enhance the profit and power of lawyers than the liberty
and harmony of the clients and communities they served. Indeed, the very
trends that help explain Americans' distinct "adversarial spirit" also help
explain widespread antipathy toward lawyers, common law reception, and
the adversary system as exclusive and undemocratic. After all, it was elite
Whig-Federalist lawyers, not democratic populists, who labored for
decades to check this antipathy by touting the merits of adversarial
legalism in print and public speech."'s Tocqueville's quip about law
117. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (1 How.) 272 (1855).
118. COOK, supra note 24; FRIEDMAN, supra note 14; MILLER, supra note 75; Spaulding, supra
note 24; Spaulding, The Luxury of the Law: The Codification Movement and the Right to Counsel, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 983 (2004). Whatever its merits, the early American enclosure of justice also
generally entailed the exclusion of women and people of color. See Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 83
U.S. (I Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding exclusion of women from practice of law); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1831); BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK, WOMAN LAWYER: THE TRIALS OF
CLARA FOLTZ 156-62 (2010); KATHLEEN BROWN, GOOD WIVES, NASTY WENCHES, AND ANXIOUS
PATRIARCHS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 185-86, 284 (1996); FRIEDMAN,
supra note 14, at 226 ("[A] slave who wanted his day in court faced formidable barriers. No slave
could testify against his master. In some states, no black could testify against a white man at all."); id.
at 227 (noting disqualification in 1803 in Indiana Territory of "negro[s]," "mulatto[s]" and "Indian[s]"
except in cases where they were sued by the United States or in civil cases where only people of color
were parties); id. at 639 (discussing general prohibitions on the practice of law by women and blacks);
Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Service, 61 U. CINN. L.
REV. 1139 (1993); Katherine Hermes, "Justice Will Be Done Us": Algonquian Demands for
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having become our "vulgar tongue" is made in a chapter about why
lawyers are the only naturally "aristocratic" class in democratic society
and how their habitual caution and adherence to precedent act to check
popular democratic excess.l 9 Our history thus reveals ambivalence
regarding the adversary system rising to meet its prevalence, its increased
procedural formality, the prominence of the legal profession, and the
grandeur of third-wave courthouses.
Still, we have arrived at a kind of crossroads. The gradual process of
enclosure in the design and operation of courthouses and alternative
dispute resolution systems has accelerated. Popular reproductions of
trial-reproductions whose dramatic content derives from exposing the
stages of trial in intimate detail, particularly those stages ordinarily
shielded from public view (jury deliberation, side-bar conferences,
attomey-client communication, attorney investigation, and negotiation)-
have continued to proliferate. At the same time, cultural and political
tolerance for other even more enclosed practices (preemptive warfare,
indefinite detention, torture, and, most significantly, targeted killing) has
increased dramatically.12 0 Law is thus simultaneously rendered relatively
invisible in its formal administration, vividly present in the substitutionary
space of cultural representation, and, at least beyond our national borders,
altogether absent or dissolving into techniques of summary execution.
These genuinely "alternative" techniques are predicated in part on
sentiments not unlike those animating vigilante justice in the past-doubt
that "ordinary" due process is adequate to the threat posed, a feeling that
the local practice of justice is anachronistic, clumsy, easily manipulated
by the guilty, and fraught with peril (personal, dignitary, and financial) for
the innocent. But for the state to mobilize the sentiments of vigilantism
itself rather than solemnly insist on ordinary legal process is most
unusual. The almost complete enclosure of practices like targeted killing
(keystrokes on a computer in a secure location sending a signal to a
remotely controlled predator drone to release a "smart" bomb after
classified intelligence has identified the target) is equally distinctive.121
Reciprocity in the Courts of European Settlers, in THE MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA, supra
note 14, at 123; Offutt, supra note 14, at 377-84; Linda L. Sturtz, "As Though I My Self Was
Pr[e]sent": Virginia Women with Power ofAttorney, in THE MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA,
supra note 14, at 250.
119. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 84, at 309-11.
120. See Helene Cooper & Mark Landler, Targeted Killing Is New U.S. Focus in Afghanistan,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2010, at Al; Karen DeYoung & Joby Warrick, Under Obama, More Targeted
Killings than Captures in Counterterrorism Efforts, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2010, at A01; Harold
Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, The Obama Admin. and Int'l Law, Address at the
Annual Meeting of the Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/139119.htm) (describing and defending the legality of
current procedures for targeted killing). ,
121. See Christopher Drew, Drones Are Weapons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES,
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Secrecy, control, efficiency, and the coldest of bureaucratic rationalities
reach their apotheoses. Athena turns not to trial at the Areopagus, but to
bloodletting of her own in Argos, from on high.122
Enclosure is not yet an end in itself And the persistence of the dead
metaphor of courtroom trial in the popular and legal imagination may
check the desire for full enclosure. But the history of the local practice of
justice teaches nothing if not that the space in which justice is done shapes
what we think it means.
Mar. 3, 2009; see also John Markoff, War Machines: Recruiting Robots for Combat, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 2010.
122. THE ORESTEIA OF AESCHYLUS (Robert Fagles trans., 1977). In popular culture, the imagery
of target shooting has already entered political discourse. See Brian Montopoli, McCain: Sarah Palin
Is Not Inciting Violence, CBS NEWS POLITICAL HOTSHEET (Mar. 25, 2010) http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-503544_162-20001170-503544.html (describing controversy surrounding Sarah Palin's "target
list" in the 2008 presidential campaign). Border shootings by border agents and private citizens have
increased; video games and popular media also celebrate targeted killing.
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